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AVOIDING THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE:
A CALL FOR UNIFORMITY IN STATE
COURT HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
Alicia Pitts*
ABSTRACT
For decades, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has played a valuable role in
human rights litigation in U.S. courts. However, in recent years, the U.S.
Supreme Court has limited the ATS’s effectiveness in a number of respects.
In response to these decisions, many scholars have predicted that litigants
will begin to evade the restrictive ATS jurisprudence by bringing tradi-
tional ATS cases in state courts. This comment reveals that this tactic has
not become as prevalent as scholars predicted and evaluates the only two
state court cases uncovered by the author’s research. This comment then
explains why litigating would-be ATS cases in state court will lead to nega-
tive policy implications for the United States, including inconsistent treat-
ment of these claims and degradation of the federal government’s ability to
“speak with one voice” regarding foreign affairs. To prevent these issues
from arising, congressional action is needed to clarify the ATS’s intended
reach and vest federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over claims fitting
within that reach.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN the late 1700s, the first United States congress passed a short, one-sentence law called the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).1 As Judge Friendlyfamously said, the ATS is a “legal Lohengrin . . . no one seems to
know from whence it came.”2 For 170 years, the ATS lay dormant with
only a few cases calling upon its jurisdictional grant.3 However, since the
Second Circuit’s iconic 1980 decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,4 the ATS
has become a staple for human rights litigants seeking relief in American
courts.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued several decisions vastly
undercutting the ATS’s power. Not only has the Court diminished availa-
ble actionable conduct for litigants seeking to bring claims in U.S. courts,5
but it has also, with its lower court associates, questioned who can be held
liable for damages in ATS cases.6
In response to the restrictive jurisprudence surrounding the ATS, many
scholars have predicted a great rise in state court litigation, where plain-
tiffs can avoid the ATS entirely by pleading their cases under the transi-
tory tort doctrine. This strategy allows litigants to bring what the author
will call “quasi-ATS” or “would-be-ATS” cases in state courts with gen-
eral jurisdiction and fewer obstacles to relief. Under the transitory tort
doctrine, state courts may be able to hear claims otherwise barred by
ATS jurisprudence, so long as the state has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.7 Despite the many law review articles discussing this potential
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
2. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)).
3. Id.
4. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. See infra Part IV.A. State courts also allow litigants to sue a wider variety of de-
fendants than they could through ATS claims. See id.
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strategy, after an extensive search,8 the author uncovered only two state
court cases where plaintiffs actually pled actionable ATS claims as state
law torts.9 These two cases illustrate well the benefits and flexibility asso-
ciated with evading the ATS’s restraints to file in state court.
Although giving plaintiffs an avenue for relief is undoubtedly favorable
to the achievement of justice, doing so in state courts produces inconsis-
tency harmful to the American legal system and to the United States’
foreign policy. As a solution, the author urges congressional action to (1)
clarify or modify congress’s intended framework for ATS litigation, ad-
dressing recent Supreme Court cases and their impacts head-on, and (2)
preempt evasive state court litigation by vesting federal courts with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over all ATS claims. This approach allows congress to
reclaim an important area of American policy boasting serious foreign
affairs implications and further the nation’s ability to “speak with one
voice” through its political organs.
This comment provides a comprehensive look into ATS jurisprudence
and its state court counterparts. Going beyond its predecessors’ specula-
tions, this comment provides the first look at actual state court quasi-ATS
cases to determine how they have been resolved in reality. First, Part II
provides a brief summary of the ATS’s history and its rise to popularity in
the post-Filartiga era. Part III then discusses the aforementioned Su-
preme Court cases and their harsh impacts on modern human rights liti-
gation. Part IV examines the two would-be-ATS cases uncovered by the
author’s research. Finally, Part V explores federal and state inconsisten-
cies created by quasi-ATS litigation, proceeds through an assessment of
sister-state discrepancies, and concludes with a proposed solution to this
problem.
II. ALIEN TORT STATUTE: A BRIEF HISTORY
A. ENACTMENT AND EARLY USE
The Alien Tort Statute10 has a long history in the American legal sys-
tem. Passed by the first Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,11
the ATS provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”12 Nearly two centuries
after its passing, the ATS’s constitutionality was upheld in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, when the Second Circuit held that the first Congress had
power to vest district courts with jurisdiction via the ATS because “a case
properly ‘aris[es] under the . . . laws of the United States’ for Article III
purposes if grounded upon statutes enacted by Congress or upon the
8. See infra note 97.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
11. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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common law of the United States,” which includes the law of nations.13
Despite the ATS’s early enactment in American history, the statute re-
mained virtually dormant throughout its first 191 years of existence,
granting jurisdiction in only two cases.14 This dormancy changed, how-
ever, following the 1980 Filartiga decision.
B. FILARTIGA AND THE RISE OF ATS LITIGATION
Dolly Filartiga arrived in the United States in 1978 after fleeing politi-
cal oppression in Paraguay.15 Her father, Dr. Joel Filartiga, was a long-
standing opponent of then-President Alfredo Stroessner.16 In 1976,
allegedly as retaliation against his father’s political activities, Dolly’s
brother Joelito was kidnapped and tortured to death by Americo
Norberto Pena-Irala (Pena), a Paraguayan citizen and former govern-
ment official.17 After Pena entered the United States in July of 1978,
Dolly and her father learned of his whereabouts and quickly served Pena
with a summons and civil complaint seeking $10 million in damages, al-
leging Pena had wrongfully caused her brother’s death by torture.18 The
Filartigas’ recovery theories included wrongful death statutes, numerous
U.N. documents, “and other pertinent declarations, documents and prac-
tices constituting the customary international law of human rights and the
law of nations.”19 The Filartigas argued that federal subject matter juris-
diction was satisfied on federal question grounds20 and the newly-redis-
covered Alien Tort Statute.21
After dismissal at the trial court level for lack of subject matter juris-
diction, the Second Circuit reversed, finding the ATS a constitutionally
permissible jurisdictional grant22 and torture a universally condemned
and actionable international norm.23 The court relied on Supreme Court
precedent to justify examining the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly resolu-
tions, scholarly writings, and treaties as sources of contemporary interna-
tional law, ultimately finding vast support for the universal “right to be
free from torture.”24 Further, the court paved the way for future litigation
seeking ATS relief from injury incurred abroad by upholding its jurisdic-
tion over “transitory tort claims between individuals over whom they ex-
13. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2).
14. Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 771 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.
Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607)) (discussing the history of the ATS).
15. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 878–79.
19. Id. at 879.
20. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012)).
21. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).
22. See supra Part II.A.
23. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–85 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900);
United States v. Smith, 28 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820)).
24. Id. at 883–85.
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ercise personal jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred.”25 In the end,
four years after Joelito’s horrific death, the Filartigas’ case was remanded
for further proceedings,26 and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York awarded them $10,385,364 in expenses and punitive
damages.27
After Filartiga, ATS litigation increased dramatically in U.S. courts.
One scholar’s survey revealed at least thirty-three nonfrivolous, non-pro
se ATS suits between Filartiga and the year 1991.28 Most of the successful
cases during this time period sued state officials for torture and extrajudi-
cial killings, claims still common to ATS suits today.29 A significant num-
ber of ATS claims also included “garden-variety” state law tort claims
such as assault, battery, or intentional infliction of emotional distress as
grounds for relief, which were sometimes successful, depending on the
underlying federal claims’ successes in each case.30 Finally, modern stud-
ies reveal that over 300 ATS claims have been filed since the Filartiga
opinion came down.31 While plaintiffs have never had overwhelming suc-
cess in ATS litigation, one scholar’s survey of cases showed that over half
of all cases making it to the merits were resolved in favor of the plain-
tiffs.32 Unfortunately for plaintiffs, reaching the merits has proven a very
burdensome task, as several Supreme Court decisions have limited or cast
doubt upon the conduct and defendants available to comprise viable ATS
claims.33
III. RESTRICTIONS ON THE ATS
As the number of ATS cases has grown, so have the limits on litigants’
leeway in pleading actionable ATS claims. In two prominent cases, Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain34 and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,35 the
Court limited cognizable causes of action and the extraterritorial reach of
the ATS, respectively. Additionally, courts have decreased the number of
viable defendants in ATS cases by questioning whether corporations can
25. Id. at 885.
26. Id. at 889.
27. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 867 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
28. Cortelyou C. Kenney, Measuring Transnational Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1053, 1083 n.160 (2015). In 1991, the Torture Victim Protection Act was added to the
ATS, allowing U.S. citizens, as well as aliens, to sue individuals acting under color of law
who commit torture or extrajudicial killing. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,
Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)).
29. Kenney, supra note 28, at 1084.
30. See, e.g., Krishantl v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-CV-05395, 2014 WL 1669873, at *14
(D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014) (allowing claims for aiding and abetting crimes against humanity
under the ATS and state common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims to proceed in suit by bombing victims against a financial supporter of a terrorist
group).
31. Kenney, supra note 28, at 1073, 1078 tbl.1.
32. Id. at 1073.
33. See id. (noting that of 325 ATS cases resolved, only 17% made it to the merits).
34. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
35. 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
1214 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
be liable for international law violations.36 Finally, the “state action” re-
quirement required by courts in pleading numerous international norms
renders sovereign immunity a nearly-unavoidable obstacle to relief.37
A. LIMITING ACTIONABLE CONDUCT
1. Sosa: Accepted and Specific Norms
In 1990, Mexican doctor Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez) was in-
dicted for allegedly helping to prolong a kidnapped American Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) agent’s interrogation and torture in
Mexico before his eventual murder.38 After a warrant was issued for Al-
varez’s arrest and the Mexican government refused to extradite him, the
DEA organized and executed a plan to hire Mexican nationals to seize
Alvarez and bring him into the United States to stand trial.39 Mexican
defendant Jose Francisco Sosa (Sosa) and his colleagues abducted Alva-
rez, held him overnight, and then flew him to El Paso, Texas, where he
was arrested by federal officers.40
After the Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over Alvarez’s criminal
case despite his allegedly illegal abduction,41 Alvarez was tried and ulti-
mately acquitted in 1992.42 Once Alvarez returned to Mexico, he sued
Sosa, a Mexican citizen; four DEA agents; the United States; and five
other unnamed Mexicans in federal court using the ATS as his jurisdic-
tional base.43 The trial court awarded Alvarez $25,000 in damages against
Sosa under the ATS for “arbitrary arrest and detention” in violation of
the law of nations, an award later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.44
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the ATS
“[did] no more than vest federal courts with jurisdiction, neither creating
nor authorizing the courts to recognize any particular right of action with-
out further congressional action,” or whether the ATS empowered fed-
eral courts to hear claims arising under the law of nations and recognized
at common law.45 Sosa, and the United States as his supporter, argued for
the former interpretation, while Alvarez supported the latter.46 While the
Court agreed that the ATS was strictly jurisdictional, it explained that the
ATS does not require further congressional action to be of use to litigants
36. See infra Part III.B.1.
37. See infra Part III.B.2.
38. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–98.
39. Id. at 698.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 658 (1992)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 699 (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620 (9th Cir.
2003), vacated, 374 F.3d 1384 (9th Cir. 2004)). Alvarez’s claims against the United States
and other parties are irrelevant for the purposes of this paper; accordingly, only the ATS
claim will be discussed.
45. Id. at 712.
46. Id.
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because such an interpretation would render the ATS “stillborn.”47 In-
stead, the Court agreed with amici in declaring the ATS to be a jurisdic-
tional grant allowing federal courts to entertain claims for torts in
violation of the law of nations, which “would have been recognized
within the common law of the time.”48
Subsequently, the Court addressed the three international law viola-
tions recognized when the ATS was passed, namely, “violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”49 Since
this “narrow set” of judicial remedies for torts “threatening serious con-
sequences in international affairs” was likely what the first Congress had
in mind, the Court reasoned, conduct underlying present-day ATS claims
must also “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civi-
lized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of
the 18th-century paradigms.”50 Accordingly, as “relatively brief” arbi-
trary detention boasts no universal, specific prohibition, the Court ulti-
mately rejected Alvarez’s ATS claim and denied him relief under the
ATS.51
The Sosa opinion’s acceptance and specificity test has been understood
as a reference to what scholars call the norms of customary international
law.52 These norms “result[ ] from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”53 Thus, courts
generally hold jurisdiction is satisfied when litigants bring ATS claims sat-
isfying this criteria. Some examples of customary international norms in-
clude official or state sponsored torture,54 genocide,55 war crimes,56 and
crimes against humanity.57 By contrast, claims alleging more undefined
human rights violations like forced labor and human trafficking,58 arbi-
47. Id. at 712–14.
48. Id. at 714.
49. Id. at 715.
50. Id. at 715, 725.
51. Id. at 695.
52. See 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3661.1 (4th ed. 2017) (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d 111, 132 (2d Cir. 2010)).
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
54. See Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Authority, 642 F.3d 1088, 1091–92 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(noting that torture committed by state actors but not by non-state actors forms a sufficient
basis for ATS jurisdiction).
55. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 253 (2d
Cir. 2009) (noting genocide can be actionable ATS conduct under Sosa with or without
state action).
56. See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 180–81 (2d Cir. 2014) (acknowledging
that war crimes can be asserted under the ATS).
57. See id. (noting that crimes against humanity can be asserted under the ATS).
58. See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1361–63 (S.D. Fla.
2008) (holding ATS jurisdiction valid over forced labor and human trafficking where work-
ing conditions were egregious). But see Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 321–23 (2d Cir.
2012) (denying ATS jurisdiction where plaintiffs presented no evidence of physical abuse
or confinement).
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trary arrest and detention,59 and terrorism60 have been more
controversial.
In sum, modern ATS litigation requires plaintiffs to surpass high plead-
ing standards to obtain relief. Not only must claimants plead carefully
under Sosa, acknowledging the universal acceptance and specificity stan-
dard, but they must also meet the heightened “plausibility” standard im-
posed on federal courts by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly61 and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal62 in stating their claims for relief.63 Even if litigants meet these
burdens, however, their labor in meeting the Court’s lofty requirements
is, by no means, complete.
2. Kiobel: Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Nine years after Sosa, the Court unanimously decided Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.64 Kiobel involved several Nigerian plaintiffs resid-
ing in the United States who sued in U.S. court under the ATS.65 The
complaint alleged that certain Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations
aided and abetted the Nigerian government’s violations of international
law in Nigeria.66 Though the Court originally granted certiorari to decide
whether corporations, as a class, could be liable for violations of interna-
tional law, the Court ultimately opted to resolve the case in the defend-
ants’ favor by holding that the presumption against extraterritoriality
applies to the ATS.67
In deciding Kiobel, the Court relied on a series of recent decisions dis-
cussing the presumption against extraterritoriality.68 The presumption
provides that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterri-
torial application, it has none.”69 This canon of construction rests on the
“presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not
rule the world.”70 The Court held that, since neither the text of the ATS
nor the context surrounding its passing indicated that the ATS should
59. See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir.
2005) (denying ATS jurisdiction on arbitrary detention grounds where plaintiff was de-
tained for only eight hours). But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d
457, 465–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 621 F.3d 111 (2d
Cir. 2010), judgment aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (upholding ATS jurisdiction over arbi-
trary arrest and detention lasting between one day and four weeks).
60. In re Chiquita Brands Int’l., Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S’holder Derivative Litig.,
792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1321–22 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (terrorism is not sufficiently defined for
ATS purposes).
61. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
62. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
63. For further discussion of this interplay, see Jordan D. Shepherd, When Sosa Meets
Iqbal: Plausibility Pleading in Human Rights Litigation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2318 (2011).
64. 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
65. Id. at 111–12.
66. Id.
67. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 123–24.
68. Id. at 115 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
69. Id. (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 248).
70. Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 454).
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apply to torts occurring abroad, it has no extraterritorial application un-
less the claims somehow “touch and concern the territory of the United
States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption.”71 Accord-
ingly, as the alleged human rights violations before the court in Kiobel
occurred entirely within foreign countries, and “mere corporate pres-
ence” in the U.S. was declared an insufficient basis to rebut the presump-
tion, the claimants were denied relief under the ATS.72
After Kiobel, the majority of fully-resolved ATS cases have been dis-
missed on extraterritoriality grounds, and defendants have seen their
highest-ever win rate.73 Professor Kenney proposes defendants’ win rates
are partially due to plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissals after Kiobel’s deterrent
effect.74 “Foreign cubed” cases involving an alien plaintiff, alien defen-
dant, and tort occurring outside the United States have frequently been
dismissed via the presumption for insufficient ties to the United States.75
Moreover, even “foreign squared” cases involving American defendants
have been dismissed on extraterritoriality grounds.76 Finally, the U.S. Cir-
cuit Courts have vastly disagreed on how to interpret and satisfy Kiobel’s
“touch and concern” standard for rebutting the presumption.77 This un-
certainty, combined with Sosa’s lofty standards for proving a violation of
the law of nations, has rendered the ATS a risky and arduous route for
victims of human rights abuses, as the only viable actions sufficient to
satisfy ATS jurisdiction are violations of specific and accepted interna-
tional norms that either occur on U.S. territory or “touch and concern”
the United States to a still-mysterious degree.
B. LIMITING DEFENDANTS
1. The Corporate Liability Question
Over the years, litigants have increasingly used the ATS to sue corpo-
rate, rather than individual, defendants for human rights violations.78 Al-
leged violations often include “aiding and abetting” recognized violations
of human rights by individual perpetrators over whom personal jurisdic-
tion in U.S. courts would be difficult to obtain.79 While the Fourth,80 Sev-
71. Id. at 115–22, 124–25.
72. Id. at 124–25.
73. See Kenney, supra note 28, at 1105–06 (as of 2015).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 185
(D.D.C. 2013)).
76. Id. (citing Doe v. Drummond Co., Inc., 782 F.3d 576, 596 (11th Cir. 2015)) (“Al-
though the U.S. citizenship of Defendants is relevant to our inquiry, this factor is insuffi-
cient to permit jurisdiction on its own.”).
77. Alicia Pitts, Note, Extraterritoriality and the Alien Tort Statute—Narrow Applica-
tion Preserves Crucial Boundaries, 71 SMU L. REV. 607, 612–14 (2018).
78. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 112–13 (2015)
(where defendants were several foreign corporations).
79. See id.; Cheme`ne I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in Human Rights
Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81, 82–83 (2013).
80. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2010).
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enth,81 Ninth,82 Eleventh,83 and D.C.84 Circuits have recognized
corporate liability under the ATS, the Second Circuit held that corpora-
tions cannot be liable under the ATS because “[n]o corporation has ever
been subject to any form of liability . . . under the customary international
law of human rights.”85 Thus, the Court concluded, “the ATS . . . simply
does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations.”86 The Fifth
Circuit has not directly addressed the issue.87
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court declined to resolve the corpo-
rate liability issue in Kiobel, prolonging uncertainty for litigants seeking a
viable defendant.88 This significant question was somewhat resolved by
the Supreme Court this term in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, when it held
that foreign corporations could not be held liable under the ATS.89 This
opinion did little to resolve this area of law, however, as it left open the
possibility of liability for domestic corporations and still failed to provide
clear guidance for courts analyzing the issue.
2. Sovereign Immunity
Finally, the last barrier facing plaintiffs seeking a viable defendant is
the sovereign immunity doctrine. Because several violations of the law of
nations require state-sponsored conduct as an element of the claim, state
representatives and organs are regularly sued under the ATS.90 Although
plaintiffs often attempt to avoid this doctrine by alleging private individu-
als acted “under color of law” in committing human rights violations, this
strategy has not produced overwhelming success.91 Accordingly, sover-
eign immunity remains a prominent ground for dismissal in ATS cases
against both domestic and foreign sovereigns.92
81. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011).
82. See Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014).
83. See Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
84. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011), judgment vacated
on other grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
85. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2010).
86. Id.
87. The Fifth Circuit may have implicitly accepted corporate liability when it dismissed
plaintiffs’ ATS claims for failure to meet pleading requirements without addressing corpo-
rate liability. However, this case was published before corporate liability became such a
hotly contested issue. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164–69 (5th Cir.
1999) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)).
88. See supra Part III.A.2.
89. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018).
90. See 13 JONATHAN I. BLACKMAN, BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FED-
ERAL COURTS § 137:27 (4th ed. 2017) (discussing state action in ATS litigation).
91. See id.; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The ‘color of law’
jurisprudence . . . is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in official action
for purposes of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act.”).
92. Kenney, supra note 28, at 1077. See also Zuza v. Office of High Representative,
107 F. Supp. 3d 90, 93 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding defendant’s immunity from suit required
dismissal of ATS case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY: STATE COURTS
AND STATE LAW
Due to the many constraints imposed upon ATS claims in federal
court, many scholars have predicted a rise in quasi-ATS litigation in state
courts using state tort law.93 In state courts, tort claims arising in foreign
countries may be asserted under the transitory tort doctrine without in-
voking the ATS at all.94 Additionally, state courts are not constrained by
the strict pleading requirements imposed on the ATS by Sosa or those
imposed on all claims in Twombly and Iqbal.95 Lastly, although state
court litigants still face the threat of forum non conveniens dismissal,
state court litigation avoids Kiobel’s effective ban on claims centering on
extraterritorial conduct.96 Although state court litigation has been widely
predicted to follow after the Kiobel and Sosa decisions, the author’s ex-
tensive research97 reflected only two state court quasi-ATS cases since
Kiobel.98 This part will explore the benefits of state litigation and con-
clude by discussing the two recent state court quasi-ATS cases.
A. TRANSITORY TORT LITIGATION AND ITS BENEFITS
State courts enjoy general subject matter jurisdiction with no restraints
comparable to those restricting federal courts.99 Accordingly, it has long
been accepted that state courts may hear cases involving torts occurring
outside the forum state, so long as the court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.100 Finally, state courts are allowed to form their own pro-
cedural rules and are, thus, not bound by the federal “plausibility” stan-
dard announced in Twombly and Iqbal.101 Although many jurisdictions
have adopted plausibility, some hold fast to the previous “notice” plead-
ing standard, allowing careful litigants to avoid plausibility if personal ju-
risdiction over the defendant is available.102
Accordingly, would-be ATS plaintiffs can sue in state courts for inter-
national law violations, characterized as run-of-the-mill common law
torts, without being bound to the “plausibility” standard or the restrictive
93. See, e.g., Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under
State Law and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 17–20 (2013).
94. See infra Part IV.A.
95. See infra Part IV.B.1.
96. See infra Part IV.B.2.
97. To find these cases, numerous Westlaw searches were conducted seeking cases in
civil court from all fifty states. Searches were conducted using various terms and connec-
tors to find cases discussing torts, transitory torts, common ATS conduct, and foreign de-
fendants or territory. Each case was then read to determine whether the plaintiffs could
alternatively bring an action under the ATS. Of the hundreds of cases reviewed, only two
state court cases met the relevant criteria.
98. See infra Part IV.C.
99. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
100. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990).
101. See Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split Between
Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 109–10 (2010).
102. Joseph W. Owen, A ‘Plausible’ Future: Some State Courts Embrace Heightened
Pleading After Twombly and Iqbal, 36 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 104, 120–27 (2013).
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jurisprudence shadowing the ATS.103 For example, a Sudanese plaintiff
alleging a Sudanese citizen performed a terrorist stabbing in Sudan caus-
ing harm to his Sudanese family member could be rejected in federal
court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.104 However, if the perpetra-
tor even steps foot within a U.S. state long enough to be served with
process,105 that same Sudanese plaintiff could bring a state law tort case
against him for assault and battery, avoiding the ATS’s constraints en-
tirely. Given that a defendant maintaining “minimum contacts” with the
United States can potentially be sued in state or federal court,106 one
could easily see why a state court tort strategy may be preferred over
ATS litigation in this or a similar situation.
B. RECENT STATE COURT CASES
1. Acain v. International Plant Services
In Acain v. International Plant Services,107 fifty-seven Filipino former
employees of a Texas corporation (IPS) sued in Texas state court alleging
human trafficking,108 along with several contract and tort claims.109 The
named defendants included IPS, the Filipino agency (MBC) that re-
cruited them to work for IPS, and several individual IPS and MBC em-
ployees.110 The plaintiffs’ claims alleged that the defendants had engaged
in a human trafficking scheme by fraudulently inducing them to sign em-
ployment contracts and failing to abide by their terms.111 Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged they were denied promised payment, placed in debt
bondage, threatened with deportation, and refused the option to find em-
ployment elsewhere.112
At trial, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on international com-
ity grounds, finding the Philippines’ Overseas Employment Agency and
the country’s related, extensive regulations regarding overseas employ-
ment of Filipino citizens merited the court’s restraint in exercising juris-
103. See Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 93, at 11; see also Roger P. Alford, The Fu-
ture of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1750 (2014)
(“Almost every international law violation is also an intentional tort. Torture is assault and
battery. Terrorism is wrongful death. Slavery is false imprisonment.”).
104. See In re Chiquita Brands Int’l., Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S’holder Derivative
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1321–22 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (terrorism is too indefinite to meet
the Sosa test); Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 185,
204–05 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying jurisdiction in a “foreign cubed” case on extraterritoriality
grounds).
105. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 606 (1990) (upholding tran-
sient jurisdiction).
106. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
107. 449 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
108. Human trafficking and forced labor may be actionable ATS conduct if conditions
are egregious. See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1361–63 (S.D.
Fla. 2008).
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diction.113 On appeal, however, the First District Court of Appeals in
Houston reversed, applying the comity test found in the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.114 This test
recommends courts examine a number of factors and decline to exercise
jurisdiction only if it would be “unreasonable.”115 After extensive analy-
sis, the court concluded that several factors supported Texas’s exercise of
jurisdiction, including many of the parties’ Texas residence, the perform-
ance of wrongful acts in Texas, and Texas’s interest in preventing human
trafficking within Texas.116 The court also noted that forum non con-
veniens law supported its conclusion, as, under Texas law, “dismissal is
proper only if the balance of factors weighs heavily against Texas and in
favor of the alternative forum.”117 Accordingly, the case was remanded
for further proceedings,118 a significant win for these would-be ATS
plaintiffs.
2. Elmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd.
In Elmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd.,119 fifty Israeli plaintiffs, including
family members and estates of deceased individuals killed in terror at-
tacks by Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas, sued the Bank of
China (BOC), alleging BOC was negligent and breached a statutory duty
under Israeli law.120 In particular, the plaintiffs claimed that BOC’s acts
“proximately caused” the victims’ injuries by “help[ing] facilitate the
transfer of millions of dollars between PIJ and Hamas leadership outside
Israel and their operatives inside Israel, enabling the two organizations to
plan, prepare, and undertake acts of terrorism in Israel.”121 BOC officials
allegedly had actual knowledge that the transfers were used for terrorism
in April 2005, but refused to stop them until January 2007.122
At trial, the parties first disagreed on which country’s law should gov-
ern. The plaintiffs argued that Israeli law governed the action, as it pro-
vided a “unique” private cause of action for a defendant’s violation of a
statutorily-imposed duty.123 The defendants, however, argued that New
York or Chinese law should apply, as the transfers allegedly occurred in
New York and the bank was based in China.124 The laws of New York
and China impose no comparable duty and, thus, would defeat the plain-
tiffs’ negligence claim.125 After the trial court implicitly applied New
113. Id. at 658.
114. Id. at 660–64 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 660–61.
116. Id. at 664.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 665.
119. 971 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
120. Id. at 508.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 509.
123. Id. at 512–13 (referring to the duty against aiding and abetting terrorism).
124. Id. at 514–15.
125. Id. at 512–13.
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York’s substantive law, the appellate division reversed this point, choos-
ing Israeli law to govern the action since “Israel, the location of the plain-
tiffs’ injuries, ha[d] the greatest interest in seeing its laws enforced.”126
Finally, the court held that enforcing this Israeli law was appropriate in
New York courts, despite China’s interest in regulating its banks, and re-
fused to dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds.127 In the end,
the court denied BOC’s motion to dismiss, allowing the Israeli plaintiffs
to pursue the case in New York state court.128 In doing so, the Elmaliach
court relied extensively on Second Circuit precedent.129 Its ruling was
consistent with federal law in some respects, but diverged dramatically on
extraterritorial grounds.
V. ANALYZING THE DESIRABILITY OF STATE COURT
“ATS” LITIGATION
As Acain and Elmaliach illustrate, there are numerous benefits availa-
ble to litigants who wish to avoid the ATS’s constraints by choosing to
plead their cases as run-of-the-mill torts in state court. While some schol-
ars have argued that state court litigation will prove ineffective in practice
due to limits like forum non conveniens and conflict of laws,130 avoiding
the ATS altogether will nevertheless dramatically increases plaintiffs’
chances at success.131 Re-characterizing international law violations as
“battery,” “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” or “fraud” lowers
pleading standards, frees litigants from limits on extraterritorial conduct,
and eludes the corporate liability question. Although this alternative is
favorable to plaintiffs and to the U.S.’s role in combating human rights
violations, inconsistent treatment of state and federal claimants essen-
tially alleging the same thing could have harmful policy implications for
the United States. Not only do inconsistencies abound between federal
and state court treatment of ATS or quasi-ATS claims, but they may also
arise between states due to state sovereignty and judicial discretion on
matters like conflicts of laws and forum non conveniens.
Without clear guidance for states in quasi-ATS litigation, the U.S.’s ap-
proach to human rights litigation will become jumbled and unpredictable,
leading to issues like forum shopping, conflicting state involvement in for-
eign affairs, and circumvention of congress’s intent in enacting the ATS.
As a solution, the author urges congress to supplement or amend the
ATS to clarify its desired approach to international human rights litiga-
126. Id. at 508–09, 515–16.
127. Id. at 518–19.
128. Id. at 519.
129. See id. at 510–19 (citing Licci American Express Bank Ltd., 704 F. Supp 2d 403
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
130. Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict-of-Laws Considerations in State Court Human Rights
Actions, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 45, 61 (2013) (arguing state courts may “shy away” from
international law principles in human rights litigation, leading to little relief for plaintiffs in
state court actions).
131. This is especially true in “foreign cubed” cases. See supra Part III.A.2.
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tion and vest exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts to hear cases fitting
its intended realm of cases.
As the court declared in Filartiga, ATS cases are “fraught with implica-
tions for the nation as a whole, and therefore should not be left to the
potentially varying adjudications of the courts of the fifty states.”132 In an
increasingly globalized world where human rights abuses are of interna-
tional concern, Congress must decide, once and for all, how the United
States will treat those seeking relief in U.S. courts. The nation’s elected
representatives, rather than individual state court judges, should choose
to widely re-open federal courts, close them entirely, or craft some crite-
ria for properly-brought ATS cases. Exercising congressional authority
and preempting state action by requiring careful alertness to “disguised”
ATS claims would enable the federal government to decisively “speak . . .
with one voice” by taking a determined, uniform approach to human
rights litigation.133
A. FEDERAL AND STATE INCONSISTENCIES
1. Case Study: Acain and Elmaliach as Federal ATS Claims
In Acain and Elmaliach, the plaintiffs’ state law claims surpassed every
federal ATS hurdle solely due to their choice of forum. This part will
examine how Acain and Elmaliach could have turned out had they been
presented as ATS cases in federal court.
First, had Acain been asserted as an ATS case in federal court, the
outcome would likely have been less favorable to the Filipino plaintiffs.
The conduct underlying their human trafficking claim has been accepted
under Sosa in some courts and rejected in others, usually depending on
the plaintiffs’ physical and mental suffering at the defendants’ hands.134
In Acain, the plaintiffs alleged they were “forced to endure cramped liv-
ing conditions, subjected to random unannounced visits . . . required to
stay at their apartments while unemployed, denied visitors, had their mail
opened . . . and threatened with arrest or deportation if they complained
about their unemployment.”135 These conditions, while undoubtedly
harsh and inhumane, would likely not meet the egregious suffering
threshold required for human trafficking harms under the ATS.136
Further, the Acain plaintiffs satisfied personal jurisdiction over the de-
132. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
133. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000).
134. See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1361–63 (S.D. Fla.
2008) (holding ATS jurisdiction valid over forced labor and human trafficking where work-
ing conditions were egregious). But see Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 321–23 (2d Cir.
2012) (denying ATS jurisdiction where plaintiffs presented no evidence of physical abuse
or confinement).
135. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 9, Acain v. Int’l Plant Servs., LLC, 449 S.W.3d
655 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (No. 2011-32519).
136. See Licea, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 1361–63 (noting plaintiffs were burned and severely
electrocuted due to unsafe working conditions and painfully injured after working sixteen-
hour days for up to forty-five days straight).
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fendants through suing IPS, a Texas corporation.137 While suing corpo-
rate defendants is still an available strategy for the time being,
considering the Supreme Court’s recent restrictive ATS interpretation
and the tendency of the Fifth Circuit (the pertinent federal jurisdiction)
to follow suit,138 the plaintiffs’ chances of success in securing a corporate-
defendant ATS judgment seem slim to none.
Finally, the Acain plaintiffs would likely face difficulty rebutting the
presumption against extraterritoriality in federal court, as many of the
most important facts alleged occurred abroad. Although a substantial
portion of the plaintiffs’ labor and financial suppression occurred in
Texas, the Filipino individuals were actually recruited, promised work,
and presented with “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts after paying their
“placement fees” in the Philippines.139 Depending on whether the actions
within Texas were severe enough to constitute an international law viola-
tion, an ATS claim could very likely fail on extraterritoriality grounds.140
Attempts to bring the Elmaliach suit in federal court would likewise be
futile. Here, the alien plaintiffs could have attempted to sue the bank in
federal court under the ATS for aiding and abetting violations of interna-
tional law, relying on Licci by Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL as
precedent.141 However, they likely would have encountered similar hard-
ships to the plaintiffs in Acain.
First, aiding and abetting an international law violation is a well-recog-
nized ATS claim.142 Terrorism, however, is not always recognized as a
sufficient Sosa international norm to be aided and abetted.143 In the Sec-
ond Circuit, however, the attacks themselves may be characterized as
crimes against humanity depending on their seriousness.144 Thus, the
New York plaintiffs may be able to prevail on the Sosa test.
Next, the court would consider Kiobel and the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality. In Licci, the court held that the acts in question “touched
and concerned” the United States with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality. This was because the bank alleg-
edly wired money “exclusively” from an account in its New York location
137. Acain, 449 S.W.3d at 657.
138. See Pitts, supra note 77, at 4–11 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive interpreta-
tion of the Kiobel “touch and concern” inquiry and noting the interpretation’s consistency
with likewise restrictive Supreme Court precedent).
139. Brief for Appellant, supra note 135, at 7–11.
140. See Pitts, supra note 77, at 4–5 (citing Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845
F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017)).
141. 834 F.3d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluding plaintiffs successfully alleged a bank
aided and abetted in terrorist attacks in violation of international law but denying liability
on corporate liability grounds).
142. See id. at 219–20; Adhikari v. KBR Inc., No. 4:16-CV-2478, 2017 WL 4237923, at
*6–7 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2017).
143. See In re Chiquita Brands Int’l., Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S’holder Derivative
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1321–22 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (terrorism is too indefinite for ATS
purposes). But see Licci, 834 F.3d at 218–19.
144. Licci, 834 F.3d at 218–19 (the court does not distinguish between attacks by
Hezbollah as qualifying as either terrorist attacks or crimes against humanity).
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with knowledge that the transfers benefited Hezbollah.145 As the allega-
tions in Elmaliach are essentially the same, the plaintiffs might also sur-
pass Kiobel’s restriction in federal court.146 Trouble waits, however, at the
corporate liability point. As noted in Part III.A.1. above, the Second Cir-
cuit refuses to hold corporations liable under the ATS.147 Thus, despite
overcoming both the Sosa and Kiobel pleading hurdles, Elmaliach’s ATS
claim would categorically fail if brought in federal court.
2. Foreign Policy Implications
Throughout history, the U.S. government has carefully protected the
federal government’s ability to “speak with one voice” regarding foreign
affairs. This principle arises commonly in cases involving foreign com-
merce148 and diplomacy or recognition.149 Although neither of these prin-
ciples is directly or explicitly addressed in ATS suits (and their state court
counterparts), both foreign commerce and diplomacy are undoubtedly af-
fected by the United States’ approach to human rights litigation.
First, foreign commerce could be upset by inconsistent state court and
federal court human rights litigation, depending on the Supreme Court’s
decision on corporate liability for international law violations.150 Since
defendants are generally amenable to a federal or state court suit wher-
ever plaintiffs can establish that personal jurisdiction exists,151 foreign
corporations may open themselves to uncertain liability by conducting
business in various U.S. states.152 Assuming the Court will follow its re-
cent restrictive ATS interpretation and limit corporate liability in ATS
suits, foreign corporations will now need to watch which state courts have
opened themselves to quasi-ATS claims in deciding where to operate.153
Some foreign companies may be deterred or driven to leave states partic-
ularly friendly to litigants, limiting available economic opportunities
available to those states’ citizens and disrupting foreign commerce as a
whole. Contrary to the Framers’ intent in crafting the American govern-
ment, allowing state court litigants to avoid the ATS’s requirements un-
dermines the federal government’s ability to “speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments”154 by produc-
ing serious inconsistencies between federal and state law. These inconsis-
tencies must be addressed for the nation as a whole if this issue is to be
avoided.
145. Id. at 217–19.
146. See Elmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd., 971 N.Y.S.2d 504, 508–09 (N.Y. App. Div.
2013).
147. See supra note 85.
148. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 298 (1994).
149. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015).
150. See supra Part III.B.1.
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
152. See Acain v. v. Int’l Plant Servs., 449 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2014, pet. denied) (allowing suit against corporation to proceed in Texas state court).
153. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
154. Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 359 (1984).
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Second, inconsistent state court human rights litigation may disrupt the
federal government’s uniform approach to foreign human rights litiga-
tion, in violation of the Supremacy Clause as it relates to foreign af-
fairs.155 For example, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,156 the
Court struck down a Massachusetts law “restricting the authority of its
agencies to purchase goods or services from companies doing business
with Burma” on Supremacy Clause grounds.157 The Court reasoned that
the Massachusetts law surpassed and conflicted with the federal govern-
ment’s existing policy to deal with Burma’s human rights issues and was,
thus, preempted by federal law.158 Likewise, in Zschernig v. Miller,159 the
Court declared an Oregon probate law unconstitutional when it required
state officials to judge foreign officials’ credibility and “ma[de] unavoida-
ble judicial criticism of nations” whose governments are established on
different principles than the U.S.160 The Court noted that, although pro-
bate regulations are traditionally left to the states, “those regulations
must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign
policy.”161 Likewise, traditional state tort litigation should also yield to
congressional action when doing so is necessary to promote the Nation’s
foreign policy.
In ATS cases, state court recognition of otherwise-barred federal ATS
claims conflicts with and surpasses federal law by providing state lawsuits
where Congress and the Supreme Court (with congressional acquies-
cence) have foreclosed the same claims through the ATS.162 As noted
above, the Filartiga court emphasized the first congress’s wisdom in vest-
ing jurisdiction over human rights claims in the federal courts since these
cases carry many foreign implications.163 Allowing state courts to now
exceed that carefully delegated authority runs contrary to the principles
set forth in Crosby.164 A remedy must be crafted before serious harms
come to light.
Finally, allowing states to critique the acts of foreign current or previ-
ous state officials, as is often involved in ATS suits,165 directly contradicts
Miller.166 When a court pronounces its judgment in a viable ATS or simi-
lar case, the actions alleged are egregious.167 However, the Supremacy
155. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
156. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
157. Id. at 366.
158. Id. at 373–86.
159. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
160. Id. at 440.
161. Id.
162. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–86 (2000) (holding
state law unconstitutional where its restrictions went further than federal restrictions).
163. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.3d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
164. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373–86.
165. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (defendant was a former government official);
Mezerhane v. Repu´blica Bolivariana de Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 545 (11th Cir. 2015) (de-
fendant was a sovereign nation).
166. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968).
167. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (explaining that actions must be
egregious to earn international condemnation).
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Clause forbids states from effectively overriding a longstanding statute to
enact their own foreign policy regarding these violations.168 Allowing
state courts to continue to cast judgments in an essentially executive func-
tion is understandably dangerous for the nation as a whole. As in Crosby
and Miller, state court participation in human rights litigation, though val-
iant and commendable, carries harmful foreign policy implications.169
Congress should act quickly in this area before inconsistencies proliferate
and cause problems between the U.S. and foreign parties in these areas.
B. SISTER STATE INCONSISTENCIES
Beyond just federal and state inconsistencies, state court quasi-ATS lit-
igation could lead to inconsistent treatment between and even within the
states themselves. As states are free to utilize different frameworks in
numerous procedural and substantive inquiries,170 litigants in different
states alleging the same facts could see the application of different laws
via conflict of laws analysis.171 Likewise, litigants may face inconsistent
dismissals through the discretionary forum non conveniens doctrine.172
Finally, those suing even in the same state may face inconsistent applica-
tion of both conflict of laws and forum non conveniens analysis.173
For example, there are at least seven different conflict of laws analyses
available for state courts to choose from.174 While a majority of states use
the approach found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws,
notable deviators include both California and New York,175 common fora
for litigants suing corporations.176 New York uses a combined modern
approach for both tort and contract claims.177 California, however, splits
its scheme by using an interest analysis for tort claims and a combined
modern approach in contract claims.178 Since Acain showed that both
contract and tort claims can potentially be brought by would-be ATS liti-
168. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388 (“[T]he existence of conflict cognizable under the
Supremacy Clause does not depend on express congressional recognition that federal and
state law may conflict.”).
169. See id.; Miller, 389 U.S. at 441 (“The Oregon law does, indeed, illustrate the dan-
gers which are involved if each State, speaking thorough its . . . courts, is permitted to
establish its own foreign policy.”).
170. See Hoffman & Stephens, supra note 93, at 17–18 (“Each state will have its own
standards for personal jurisdiction, bounded by constitutional requirements, and its own
forum non conveniens jurisprudence. Similarly, each state will have its own pleading re-




173. See id. at 19.
174. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010:
Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 331 tbl.1 (2011).
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Doe I v. Cisco Systs., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2014);
Guobadia v. Irowa, 103 F. Supp. 3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
177. Symeonides, supra note 174, at 331 tbl.1.
178. Id.
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gants,179 the numerous results obtainable through these tests are concern-
ing when considering the possibility for inconsistencies between and
within state court systems.
Regarding choice of law, state courts are free to choose which law they
will apply between two or more alternatives when the harms occur in
multiple locales.180 For example, in Elmaliach, the plaintiffs obtained re-
lief under an Israeli statute that would have been unavailable had New
York or Chinese law been chosen.181 Even though the defendant was a
Chinese company and the relevant monetary transfers occurred through
New York branches, Israel’s law prevailed because Israel was the “place
of the injury” and “ha[d] the greatest interest in regulating conduct within
its borders.”182 This result seems a bit counterintuitive when considering
that the relevant attacks were actually carried out by absent parties to the
litigation; nevertheless, a Chinese bank was held liable in New York court
through application of Israeli law.183 This case illustrates well the appro-
priateness of ATS claims over state law’s discretionary choice of law
analysis.
Moreover, allowing this discretionary analysis by state courts in human
rights litigation may produce inconsistent results even within states. For
example, if a separate group of plaintiffs alleged similar facts to those in
Elmaliach,184 the court may very well decide New York law should apply,
foreclosing relief for these plaintiffs while allowing the case to proceed in
Elmaliach.185 These results are unfavorable to the achievement of legal
stability when contrasted with the certainty provided by the ATS.
In ATS claims, there is one source of substantive law: well-settled and
specifically defined international law.186 Applying international law is
favorable in these situations because international norms are binding on
every party in the world regardless of nationality or the place of the plain-
tiffs’ injury.187 Applying various state and foreign laws through conflict of
laws analysis could produce wide-ranging results not anchored in estab-
lished precedent. Finally, taking a non-uniform approach to human rights
litigation through diverging state court litigation could work contrary to
the universalist goal in human rights treaty-making and legislation.188
179. See Acain v. Int’l Plant Servs., LLC, 449 S.W.3d 655, 657 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
180. Elmaliach v. Bank of China, Ltd., 971 N.Y.S.2d 504, 512–14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
(deciding between New York, Israeli, and Chinese law).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 202–04.
183. Id. at 195.
184. Assuming these hypothetical plaintiffs are not in privity with the Elmaliach plain-
tiffs and, therefore, bound by res judicata. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793,
798 (1996).
185. See Elmaliach, 971 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
186. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
187. Id. at 725 (“[C]ourts should require any claim based on the present-day law of
nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world”).
188. Austen L. Parrish, State Court International Human Rights Litigation: A Concern-
ing Trend?, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 25, 38–42 (2013) (arguing that state court human rights
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Furthermore, the discretionary forum non conveniens analysis may
produce mixed results on whether plaintiffs can even proceed through the
state court system. Although forum non conveniens analysis is present in
federal courts as well,189 state courts, again, run the risk of using forum
non conveniens to pass judgments on other countries’ judiciaries by re-
quiring a subjective determination on the availability of an “adequate al-
ternative forum.”190 Instead of using forum non conveniens as the
primary way to police extraterritorial state court claims, the Kiobel
framework is preferable from a consistency standpoint.191 Federal courts
utilizing the Kiobel ATS jurisprudence have a much more workable stan-
dard on which to judge the appropriateness of exercising jurisdiction.192
Moreover, although interpretations of the “touch and concern” test vary
across the Circuits,193 many contain similar undertones and lead to simi-
lar results nationwide. This approach is much cleaner and easier to apply
than giving all fifty states and their numerous judges added discretion
through forum non conveniens analysis.
C. A CALL FOR UNIFORMITY
As discussed above, state court participation in quasi-ATS litigation
brings a dangerous potential for an increasingly fragmented American
approach to human rights. In a world where violations of international
law are, unfortunately, not all that uncommon,194 adopting a uniform na-
tional policy to address judicial relief for victims should be an urgent and
important congressional objective.
First, as Professor Parrish notes in his article, human rights policies
have traditionally been crafted on a “multilateral and collaborate” scale
rather than within nations through their various subnational parts.195 Ac-
cordingly, the United States has historically used treaties and reservations
to treaties as well as federal ATS litigation to express its views.196 State
court litigation, while perhaps a favorable short-term solution for creative
litigants seeking refuge from Sosa and Kiobel, is generally viewed unfa-
vorably by other nations in the world.197 Moreover, run-of-the-mill state
litigation subverts universalist underpinnings in human rights treaty-making and
legislation).
189. See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 612–14 (9th Cir. 2014).
190. Id. (holding Colombia was an adequate alternative forum despite the plaintiffs’
fears of physical danger if they returned to Colombia); see also Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429, 440 (1968).
191. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); see also Kenney,
supra note 28, at 1104–06 (noting that extraterritoriality is the most common grounds for
dismissal in ATS cases).
192. Extraterritoriality is at least a guiding principle in ATS cases. See Kiobel, 569 U.S.
at 124.
193. See Pitts, supra note 77, at 5–7.
194. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.3d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
195. Parrish, supra note 188, at 27.
196. Id. at 27–28.
197. Id. at 41 (citing Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International
Cases, GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 28–29 (1987)).
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tort claims fail to capture the gravity of the harm incurred by the victims
of international law violations.198 Furthermore, allowing states to form
their own policies is “in tension with” the “universal outlook” required of
human rights goals.199 In this regard, using the “states as laboratories”200
method underpinning the American federalist system fragments and de-
grades the universalist approach to human rights policy.201 The federal
government must reestablish national uniformity in human rights policy if
it will continue to collaborate with other nations to achieve internation-
ally accepted, comprehensive solutions.
D. A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
As the law currently stands, American federal courts are not hospitable
to human rights claims unless they fall within a very narrow subset of the
many international law violations that occur.202 To cure this uniformity,
U.S. lawmakers should remove these quasi-ATS claims from states’ hands
through (1) amending or supplementing the ATS to clarify its intent re-
garding human rights litigation in U.S. courts and (2) inhibiting state ac-
tion by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts for ATS claims.203
The first step in this proposed solution requires deciding whether U.S.
federal courts should be reopened to litigants through statutory modifica-
tion of Sosa or Kiobel, or whether, alternatively, the current ATS restric-
tions should limit all human rights claims falling within the ATS.
The merits of human rights litigation in U.S. courts are numerous. Al-
lowing alien plaintiffs to sue in U.S. courts may provide relief when their
home countries’ judiciaries are corrupt204 or when it would be dangerous
for the litigants to return.205 Further, allowing litigants to sue in U.S.
courts allows “U.S. courts to live up to their obligation to enforce the
collective will of the community of nations”206 and provide victims an
opportunity to pursue civil liability against their perpetrators.207 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, ensuring that defendants present in the
U.S. are amenable to suit here for their actions (even those that occurred
198. See Nathan J. Miller, Human Rights Abuses as Tort Harms: Losses in Translation,
46 SETON HALL L. REV. 505, 563 (2016) (concluding that human rights litigation should be
brought in state courts as international law violations rather than general tort harms to
adequately express the concerns at issue in international law violations).
199. Parrish, supra note 188, at 42.
200. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
201. Parrish, supra note 188, at 42.
202. See supra Part III.
203. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–86 (2000); Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968).
204. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879–80 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting the plaintiffs
argued against forum non conveniens transfer to Paraguayan courts because they believed
resorting to Paraguayan courts would be “futile”).
205. See Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 612–14 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that Co-
lombian litigants sought relief in U.S. courts because they would face physical danger if
they returned to Colombia).
206. Miller, supra note 198, at 518–19 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 585–86).
207. Id.
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abroad) “prevent[s] the United States from becoming a safe harbor . . .
for a torturer or other enemy of mankind.”208
On the other hand, opening U.S. courts to human rights litigation hav-
ing nothing to do with this country raises questions about the propriety of
injecting westernized beliefs about society into conduct occurring
abroad.209 Accordingly, the Court in Kiobel emphasized the “presump-
tion that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the
world.”210 Finally, other critics note the distaste for expending judicial
resources on cases involving foreign claimants.211
Aware of the concerns underlying each position on this issue, the Su-
preme Court Justices themselves provided numerous alternative stan-
dards for ATS litigation.212 In addition to the majority opinion by Justice
Roberts, which held that the presumption against extraterritorial conduct
applies to ATS claims unless the claims sufficiently “touch and concern”
the U.S. with sufficient force to rebut the presumption, numerous other
justices filed concurrences outlining different methodologies.213 First, Jus-
tice Alito provided an even more restrictive view, arguing that an ATS
claim should be barred on extraterritoriality grounds “unless the domes-
tic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm . . . .”214 Jus-
tice Breyer, however, proposed a more expansive solution with three
criteria for ATS jurisdiction. He wrote, “I would find jurisdiction under
this statute where (1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the
defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct sub-
stantially and adversely affects an important American national interest,”
including “preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor . . .
for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.”215 With these alter-
natives in view, it seems the majority provides the moderate, though ar-
guably unworkable, standard.
Regardless of the chosen approach, Congress should take action to
clarify ATS litigation and permanently restrict state court action in this
area, given the foreign policy concerns at issue when states exceed federal
law in pronouncing judgment on foreign actors, officials, and govern-
ments. By giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over human rights
litigation through the ATS, state courts will be unable to further fragment
U.S. foreign policy and usurp the federal government’s role in foreign
affairs. Furthermore, federal judges are presumably more qualified and
less biased due to reelection concerns, enabling them to appropriately
208. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 127 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
209. See Roxanna Altholz, Chronicle of Death Foretold: The Future of U.S. Human
Rights Litigation Post Kiobel, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1495, 1511–12 (2014).
210. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454
(2007)).
211. See, e.g., Keitner, supra note 79, at 85.
212. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124–40.
213. Id. at 124.
214. Id. at 127 (Alito, J., concurring).
215. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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handle issues like foreign diplomacy and international law. The federal
government currently exercises exclusive jurisdiction over important na-
tional concerns like immigration,216 admiralty,217 and terrorism.218 Like
immigration, admiralty, and terrorism, human rights litigation via the
ATS concerns the nation as a whole and implicates the U.S.’s foreign af-
fairs in the ways discussed in the previous section of this comment. Ad-
ding ATS litigation to the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction is,
thus, entirely consistent and appropriate in light of the nation’s
precedent.
Critics of this approach may be concerned that vesting federal courts
with exclusive jurisdiction would only decrease the likelihood of victims
obtaining justice by denying litigants the ability to circumvent Twombly,
Iqbal, Sosa, and Kiobel. Additionally, state courts may want the authority
to hear these claims when “the answer will strike closer to home.”219 For
example, where “the defendant lives in the neighborhood; . . . the corpo-
ration is a citizen of the state, with local headquarters; or . . . local re-
sidents are among the victims of the human rights abuses.”220 These
drawbacks undeniably weigh in favor of allowing state court litigation. In
the end, however, they pale in comparison to the numerous serious dan-
gers associated with circumventing the ATS.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the drafters of the ATS likely never predicted the promi-
nent role its brief law now plays in providing relief for human rights liti-
gants in modern America. After the recent restrictive Supreme Court
decisions limiting the ATS’s availability for litigants, state courts have in-
advertently become a haven for otherwise-barred ATS claims. A consis-
tent federal position on ATS litigation would provide stability and
possibly even greater relief for victims should Congress choose to
broaden available ATS claims. Amendments or supplements reflecting
modern congressional views would take the ATS out of the 1790s and
give it a much-needed face lift to address today’s realities. Likewise, do-
ing so would restore power over this important foreign affairs matter to
its intended holder, the federal government. The United States’ role as a
beacon of hope for hurting individuals is a longstanding American tradi-
tion, and empowering federal courts through congressional action to
“speak with one voice” in ATS litigation is a timely and urgent goal.
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217. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
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